(For my definition of epiphenomenalism, see http://mccomplete.blogspot.co.il/2014/03/goeps-and-hard-problem-of-consciousness.html)
On page 158, Chalmers writes, “I do not describe my view as epiphenomenalism.” His preferred terms are “natural supervenience” and “explanatory irrelevance”. If Chalmers doesn’t describe his view as epiphenomenalism, why do I describe it as epiphenomenalism?
Chalmers continues: “The question of the causal relevance of experience remains open, and a more detailed theory of both causation and experience will be required before the issue can be settled. But [my] view implies at least a weak form of epiphenomenalism, and it may end up leading to a stronger sort.”
A few pages earlier, Chalmers writes: “It remains the case that natural supervenience feels epiphenomenalistic. We might say that the view is epiphenomenalistic to a first approximation: if it allows some causal relevance for experience, it does so in a subtle way. I think we can capture this first-approximation sense by noting that the view makes experience explanatorily irrelevant. We can give explanations of behavior in purely physical or computational terms, terms that neither involve nor imply phenomenology.” (Page 154)
Chalmers is saying something like: “If you want to call me an epiphenomenalist, go right ahead.” To categorize Chalmers’ theory as a variety of epiphenomenalism is not essential to my argument, but it is a greatly simplifying move, and it makes my flow chart work. So, for the rest of the essay, I will accept Chalmers’ “first approximation”, and simply assume that Chalmers is an epiphenomenalist.
Chalmers continues: “The question of the causal relevance of experience remains open, and a more detailed theory of both causation and experience will be required before the issue can be settled. But [my] view implies at least a weak form of epiphenomenalism, and it may end up leading to a stronger sort.”
A few pages earlier, Chalmers writes: “It remains the case that natural supervenience feels epiphenomenalistic. We might say that the view is epiphenomenalistic to a first approximation: if it allows some causal relevance for experience, it does so in a subtle way. I think we can capture this first-approximation sense by noting that the view makes experience explanatorily irrelevant. We can give explanations of behavior in purely physical or computational terms, terms that neither involve nor imply phenomenology.” (Page 154)
Chalmers is saying something like: “If you want to call me an epiphenomenalist, go right ahead.” To categorize Chalmers’ theory as a variety of epiphenomenalism is not essential to my argument, but it is a greatly simplifying move, and it makes my flow chart work. So, for the rest of the essay, I will accept Chalmers’ “first approximation”, and simply assume that Chalmers is an epiphenomenalist.
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