Daniel: What do you think about Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room argument?
Bob: I don’t think Mary learns anything when she leaves the room.
Daniel: She learns what seeing colors is like, doesn’t she? She learns what seeing blue is like, she learns what seeing red is like...
Bob: What blue “is like” is not information.
Daniel: What do you mean?
Bob: Well, what is it like to see blue? Why don’t you tell me?
Daniel: You already know.
Bob: But if I didn’t, there wouldn’t be any way to communicate it to me.
Daniel: I could show you something blue.
Bob: I mean, if you couldn’t show me something blue, for whatever reason, there’s no way you could communicate to me what it’s like. What is it “like” to see blue? The answer to that question can’t be communicated, because it can’t be encoded. All the information about vision and experience is encodable, and it presumably is encoded, in our brains.
Daniel: That makes sense. I can see why you’re not convinced by Mary’s Room. I have another story, though. You could call it a variation on Mary’s Room.
Bob: Do you have a name for it?
Daniel: No. I guess you could call it The Cucumber Curse. The story is about Bob.
Bob: Bob? He sounds intelligent. Is he a neuroscientist like Mary?
Daniel: No, he’s a philosopher. A materialist, in fact.
Bob: Like most philosophers of our day.
Daniel: The trouble starts when he’s late for a lecture. On his way to the university, he cuts off another car, kind of accidentally, kind of not so accidentally. Unfortunately for Bob, the driver of the car that he cut off was The Wicked Witch of Western Philosophy. The witch goes into a fit of rage and puts a curse on Bob. Suddenly, all cucumbers start to look red.
Bob: That’s interesting. And celery is still green?
Daniel: Yes, everything green but cucumbers.
Bob: And for everyone else, the cucumbers are still green?
Daniel: Yes, for everyone else.
Bob: Well, apparently something in Bob’s brain is scrambling the color signals. Something sophisticated enough to know what is a cucumber and what isn’t.
Daniel: Well, that’s what Bob thinks at first, but then he looks over his brain logs and sees that his neurological state when looking at cucumbers is the same as his neurological state when looking at celery.
Bob: His brain logs?
Daniel: You see, Mary has invented a device which produces something like a debug log of the brain, capturing all its states and transformations.
Bob: Clearly, there’s something that these brain logs are missing. This calls for more research.
Daniel: Look, just assume that these brain logs are not missing anything, OK? The neurological state is the same, but cucumbers are red and celery is green.
Bob: So there’s a mismatch between the brain and the mind.
Daniel: Yes. The brain state of cucumber is the same as the brain state of celery, and different from the brain state of beets. However, the mind state of cucumber is the same as that of beets and different from that of celery. I agree, “green is greenish” is not information. However, “cucumbers look like beets” is information, and a description of the world that only takes matter into account loses this information.
Bob: So you’d like to draw the conclusion that, in the real world, the information “cucumbers are the same color as celery” and “cucumbers produce the same brain state as celery” are two different propositions, even though in the real world, a given brain state always corresponds to a single color.
Daniel: Yes. The information is not what green “is like”, but that green is like something. This is information that Mary knows before she leaves her room, even though she’s never experienced it. It is information that is missing from a materialist description of the world.
Bob: Very clever. However, I’m suspicious of thought experiments that resort to the supernatural. I mean, even a dualist would admit that this scenario goes against the laws of physics, as the dualist takes them to be.
Daniel: Well, in dualist physics, brain states cause mind states, but a given mind state can be influenced by a previous mind state as well as by the brain state. But you’re probably right that the cucumber story is pure fantasy even for a dualist.
Bob: In fact, it seems intuitively that such a story must break the laws of physics, even dualist physics.
Daniel: I don’t think so. I have another story.
Bob: Do tell.
Daniel: You’ll have to wait for my next blog post.
Bob: I can’t wait.
Saturday, July 10, 2010
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
A Fishy Story
“David,” said Batsheva, “did you see Avshalom take the cookie from the cookie jar?”
“No,” said David.
The funny thing is, David did see Avshalom take the cookie. And he remembers seeing it. But when he told Batsheva that he didn’t see it, he wasn’t lying. You see, David saw Avshalom take the cookie, but he believes that Avshalom can do no wrong, so he believes that he did not see Avshalom take the cookie. Even though he did see it.
My Dear Readers will be quick to point out that, in this scenario, David is probably just doubting his memory. That is, he remembers seeing Avshalom take the cookie, but he believes this memory to be false. So, let’s modify the story. It’ll be a bit less realistic, but not much.
“David,” said Batsheva, “do you remember seeing Avshalom take the cookie from the cookie jar?”
“No,” said David.
A bit trickier here, if you think about it. False memories won’t save us. David believes that he has no memory of Avshalom taking the cookie. We know (we assume for the purposes of the story) that he does indeed remember it. David is not lying, he is mistaken.
Is there something fishy about this story? It sounds plausible, but is it really possible to be mistaken about a question of what you yourself remember? Is it possible that we are consistently mistaken when we reflect on our own memories? If a skeptic challenges our belief in the content of our own memory, can we answer him, or does the skeptic win here too? Can we doubt anything, even the present contents of our own minds? Or is there something different about the present content of my mind? Something special?
How do we know what we are thinking?
David Lewis once made fun of “internalist” philosophers, who claim that we have a special relationship with our own present state of mind. He said that they always end up telling “some fishy story” about how we can have direct knowledge of our own conscious states. Is Lewis right? Or is there One True Story of the World, in which our memories are truly self-evident? Is the fishyness in Lewis’ mind, or in everyone’s mind?
I have some thoughts on this matter, but they’re not fully baked. Meanwhile, Dear Readers, please let me know what you think.
Or what you think you think.
“No,” said David.
The funny thing is, David did see Avshalom take the cookie. And he remembers seeing it. But when he told Batsheva that he didn’t see it, he wasn’t lying. You see, David saw Avshalom take the cookie, but he believes that Avshalom can do no wrong, so he believes that he did not see Avshalom take the cookie. Even though he did see it.
My Dear Readers will be quick to point out that, in this scenario, David is probably just doubting his memory. That is, he remembers seeing Avshalom take the cookie, but he believes this memory to be false. So, let’s modify the story. It’ll be a bit less realistic, but not much.
“David,” said Batsheva, “do you remember seeing Avshalom take the cookie from the cookie jar?”
“No,” said David.
A bit trickier here, if you think about it. False memories won’t save us. David believes that he has no memory of Avshalom taking the cookie. We know (we assume for the purposes of the story) that he does indeed remember it. David is not lying, he is mistaken.
Is there something fishy about this story? It sounds plausible, but is it really possible to be mistaken about a question of what you yourself remember? Is it possible that we are consistently mistaken when we reflect on our own memories? If a skeptic challenges our belief in the content of our own memory, can we answer him, or does the skeptic win here too? Can we doubt anything, even the present contents of our own minds? Or is there something different about the present content of my mind? Something special?
How do we know what we are thinking?
David Lewis once made fun of “internalist” philosophers, who claim that we have a special relationship with our own present state of mind. He said that they always end up telling “some fishy story” about how we can have direct knowledge of our own conscious states. Is Lewis right? Or is there One True Story of the World, in which our memories are truly self-evident? Is the fishyness in Lewis’ mind, or in everyone’s mind?
I have some thoughts on this matter, but they’re not fully baked. Meanwhile, Dear Readers, please let me know what you think.
Or what you think you think.
The Flotilla of the Haredim
I’m mad at Haaretz.
I mean, I’m mad at Yediot and Maariv too, but I thought Haaretz had a conscience, professionalism.
Every Haaretz article I read on Emanuel said that the parents who pulled their daughters out of the Bais Yaakov were fighting for their right to keep Sephardim out of their schools.
This is so misleading that it’s almost a lie.
The truth is that the litigants, or the prosecution, or whatever you call the lawyers who were trying to force the Emanuel parents to send their daughters back to the Bais Yaakov, claimed that the Emanuel parents intentions’ were to keep Sephardim out of their school (or, at an arm’s length in the same building). However, the Emanuel parents disputed this, and claimed that they were trying to institute a separate Bais Yaakov with higher religious standards than the original Bais Yaakov.
Who was telling the truth? I don’t know. I admit I’m a bit curious, but it’s irrelevant to my point in this blog post. My point is, that in reporting on Emanuel, Haaretz and the rest of the secular media grossly misrepresented the position of the Emanuel parents.
That was lie #1. Lie #1 was just to set the stage for Lie #2, which was much more appalling.
Having established that the Emanuel parents were fighting for their right to discriminate against Sephardim, the secular media “reported” that the huge Haredi demonstrations, staged with the support of the leaders of Ashkenazi Haredim, were in support of the right to discriminate against Sephardim.
Now, who was telling the truth, the Emanuel parents or the litigants? I don’t know. I do know one thing, though: the Haredi leaders and the Haredi demonstrators believed the parents. They were not demonstrating in support of ethnic/racial segregation -- they were demonstrating in support of the claim that the Emanuel parents were not practicing segregation. More specifically, they were demonstrating in support of the right to set religious standards for their schools.
(The policy of admitting students based on the religious standards of the parents is theoretically controversial, but it’s understandable IMAO.)
Emanuel was a trap set by the secular media, and the Haredim fell for it in the worst possible way. It was like the Tar Baby. The more the Haredim kicked and screamed and protested, the more the secular media could say, “Look how much they cherish their racism. All of them. From the leaders to the foot soldiers.” In my arrogant opinion, Emanuel did real, serious damage to the public image of the Haredim.
Why was Emanuel handled this way by the Haredim? Was it simple incompetence? I don’t think so. I think the Haredim have a PR problem. I know that the cry “Bad PR” is often an excuse, but I think in this case it’s true. The Haredim are so insular, so countercultural, so inwardly directed, that they can’t be bothered with PR. The basic attitude is, “Everyone hates us anyway.”
I mean, I’m mad at Yediot and Maariv too, but I thought Haaretz had a conscience, professionalism.
Every Haaretz article I read on Emanuel said that the parents who pulled their daughters out of the Bais Yaakov were fighting for their right to keep Sephardim out of their schools.
This is so misleading that it’s almost a lie.
The truth is that the litigants, or the prosecution, or whatever you call the lawyers who were trying to force the Emanuel parents to send their daughters back to the Bais Yaakov, claimed that the Emanuel parents intentions’ were to keep Sephardim out of their school (or, at an arm’s length in the same building). However, the Emanuel parents disputed this, and claimed that they were trying to institute a separate Bais Yaakov with higher religious standards than the original Bais Yaakov.
Who was telling the truth? I don’t know. I admit I’m a bit curious, but it’s irrelevant to my point in this blog post. My point is, that in reporting on Emanuel, Haaretz and the rest of the secular media grossly misrepresented the position of the Emanuel parents.
That was lie #1. Lie #1 was just to set the stage for Lie #2, which was much more appalling.
Having established that the Emanuel parents were fighting for their right to discriminate against Sephardim, the secular media “reported” that the huge Haredi demonstrations, staged with the support of the leaders of Ashkenazi Haredim, were in support of the right to discriminate against Sephardim.
Now, who was telling the truth, the Emanuel parents or the litigants? I don’t know. I do know one thing, though: the Haredi leaders and the Haredi demonstrators believed the parents. They were not demonstrating in support of ethnic/racial segregation -- they were demonstrating in support of the claim that the Emanuel parents were not practicing segregation. More specifically, they were demonstrating in support of the right to set religious standards for their schools.
(The policy of admitting students based on the religious standards of the parents is theoretically controversial, but it’s understandable IMAO.)
Emanuel was a trap set by the secular media, and the Haredim fell for it in the worst possible way. It was like the Tar Baby. The more the Haredim kicked and screamed and protested, the more the secular media could say, “Look how much they cherish their racism. All of them. From the leaders to the foot soldiers.” In my arrogant opinion, Emanuel did real, serious damage to the public image of the Haredim.
Why was Emanuel handled this way by the Haredim? Was it simple incompetence? I don’t think so. I think the Haredim have a PR problem. I know that the cry “Bad PR” is often an excuse, but I think in this case it’s true. The Haredim are so insular, so countercultural, so inwardly directed, that they can’t be bothered with PR. The basic attitude is, “Everyone hates us anyway.”
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