Psychons and Intentyons, Part 1: Chalmers' Challenge

In "The Conscious Mind", David Chalmers presents a fascinating argument against interactionism.  In my next few posts, I want to respond to Chalmers' argument.  Meanwhile, here is the argument for your perusal:

In any case, all forms of interactionist dualism have a conceptual problem that suggests that they are less successful at avoiding epiphenomenalism than might seem; or at least they are no better than the view I have advocated...Imagine (with Eccles) that psychons in the nonphysical mind push around physical processes in the brain, and that psychons are the seat of experience.  We can tell a story about the causal relations between psychons and physical processes, and a story about the causal dynamics among psychons, without ever invoking the fact that psychons have phenomenal properties.  Just as with physical properties, we can imagine subtracting the phenomenal properties of psychons, yielding a situation in which the causal dynamics are isomorphic.

(Page 156)

GOEPs and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Is consciousness real?  Some philosophers would answer no.  The theory that consciousness does not really exist is usually called eliminativism.

Many philosophers would answer yes.  (The theory that consciousness is real should probably be called “realism”, but it seems to me that the term “realism” is not always used in this context.)

If consciousness is real, it must be ontologically accounted for.  It must be made of something, or made of itself.  Can we account for consciousness with the familiar material categories of physics?

Many philosophers would answer yes.  Consciousness can be reduced to configurations of GOEPs (protons, neutrons, and electrons, the “good old elementary particles” of physics).  This theory is usually called materialism.

Some philosophers would answer no.  No matter how many GOEPs you throw at the problem, you will never get consciousness until you add a new ontological category, the conscious or “phenomenal” category.  The theory that consciousness can’t be realized in GOEPs is usually called dualism.

If consciousness and the GOEPs are members of two different ontological categories, what is their causal relationship?  GOEPs must have a causal influence on consciousness; after all, if I hold an orange in my hand I see an orange, if I hold an apple in my hand I see an apple.  But can my conscious experiences influence the behavior of the GOEPs in my brain?

The theory that the GOEPs have a causal influence on consciousness, but that consciousness has no influence on the GOEPs, is usually called epiphenomenalism.  The opposing theory, that both categories causally influence each other, is called interactionism.

According to epiphenomenalism, the physical properties of the brain are in the driver’s seat.  The brain has phenomenal properties too, but those properties are in the back seat, and cannot influence our behavior, our speech, or even our thoughts.