Permission to Believe

Reason is based on faith.

Think about math and science.  Math is kind of like a game played with certain axioms.  To believe that the claims of math (such as, 7 + 5 = 12) are true means to believe that the axioms are valid.  They are intuitive to us, convincing to us, and we believe them -- essentially, we have faith in them.  Science is based on the scientific method, which is really another axiom in which we trust.  (Technically speaking, positivistic science owes a large debt to the principle of proof by contradiction, which is a logical axiom, and is, of course, just another item of faith.)   To repeat my favorite Terry Eagleton quote: reason does not go all the way down.

Think about David Hume's classic example: do you believe that it is safer to go out the door than to go out the window (he was speaking, of course, of a higher-story window.)  I work on the 26th floor (at least, I believe that I do).  Do you think that it's safer for me to take the elevator down rather than squeezing through the cracks in one of the windows (God forbid)?

That belief is based on some form of inductive reasoning, inductive reasoning which has no justification outside of itself -- which is ultimately an article of faith.

What is the difference between faith in inductive reasoning, faith in arithmetic, and faith in God?  What do you think, Dear Readers?  From a theoretical standpoint, I don't think there is much difference.

Is it possible that some article of faith was actually implanted by a Cartesian demon, such as genes or "memes"?  Sure.  When I have faith, I realize that my faith could have been implanted by a Cartesian demon, but I believe that it was not; I believe that it is a true intuition.  Is there any "reason" to believe that it is a true intuition rather than a demonic implant?  Not really; faith has no external justification.  However, just as important, there is no coherent reason *not* to have faith in any article of intuition.

(See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reformed_epistemology for a similar argument.)