The king and the general: A Hasidic Parable by MC Complete

A long time ago, in a kingdom far, far away, lived a king and a general.  One day, an enemy kingdom invaded with a large army.  The king asked his general to lead the king’s army and repel the invasion.  With great ingenuity and bravery, the general repelled the invasion.

The king was very happy.  The next day, a messenger arrived at the general’s house with a beautiful white horse.

“The king has decided to honor you for your bravery,” said the messenger.  “He sent you this horse as a token of appreciation.”

“I’m sorry,” said the general.  “But I cannot accept this horse.  Please return it to the king.”

The messenger was shocked.  “Why not?” he asked.

“Because I am confident that if I wait for a few years, the king will send me a horse *and* a chariot,” replied the general.

What could he do?  The messenger returned to the king and reported to him the bizarre words of the general.

The king was furious.  “How dare the general refuse my gift?” he asked.

A few years passed.  Again, the foreign army invaded.  Again, the general repelled the invasion.  But this time, the king did not send a gift to the general.  “If my gifts are not good enough for the general, why should I bother sending them?” the king asked.

The king, of course, is Hashem.  The general is us.  Sometimes Hashem sends us physical pleasures as a reward for our mitzvos.  Sometimes we accept them with love; but sometimes we refuse them, thinking that eschewing the pleasures of this world will make us frummer.  Sometimes we even think that enjoying the pleasures of this world will dilute our reward in The Next World, as if zechuyos are stock options that may be exercised at a time of our choosing.

Is the mind a computer?

Is the mind a machine?  Daniel Dennet seems to think so.

The brain is an organ.  Organs are organic machines, components in a composite machine (the composite machine is the animal itself).  Probably, one can also analyze the brain, and see how the brain is also a composite machine, composed of smaller machines.  Maybe the mind is simply one of the smaller machines that compose the brain.

Is the mind a computer?  Dennet calls the mind a “virtual machine”.  The term “virtual machine” can mean different things in technical contexts.  The JVM (Java Virtual Machine) and a VMWare (VM here stands for “virtual machine”) image are two very different things.  Mostly what Dennet is trying to say by using this term is that the mind is software as opposed to hardware.  This distinction is very important to Dennet, and he uses it to make some interesting points, but I find it problematic and sometimes distracting.  So for the moment I want to ignore the hardware/software distinction.

Computers, unlike many other machines, deal with data.  A computer stores data in memory (and on disk, and in registers, but let’s ignore these distinctions for the moment).   The contents of memory change over time.  This gives rise to a distinction that I do not want to ignore: the distinction between data and behavior.  A computer does things, but computer memory doesn’t do anything.  The computer’s CPU does things.  The memory is there for the CPU to play with.

The CPU can do things, but without the memory, it doesn’t know what to do!  It looks to the memory for instructions on what to do next.  This adds complexity, so some computers or computer programs segment the memory into the part that contains instructions and the part that contains non-instructions, or data.

If we model the mind as a computer, consciousness should be modeled as the data memory of the computer.  A mind can be conscious of different kinds of things.  The simplest contents of consciousness may be sensory perception, but certainly includes other things, like emotions, thoughts, etc.

I sometimes like to use JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) as a semi-formal, or pseudocode, way of visualizing the contents of data memory.  Here is a pseudocode model of a conscious state:

{
 visualField: ‘Some bitmap with a computer screen’,
 desires: [
‘Solve the mind-body problem’,
‘Publish a philosophical paper’,
 ],
 volition: ‘typing’,
 beliefs: [
‘The mind is a computer’,
‘God exists’
 ]
}

At any other point in time, the memory of this mind probably has contents that are different to some extent or another, for instance:

{
 visualField: ‘Israeli salad’,
 desires: [
‘Solve the mind-body problem’,
‘Publish a philosophical paper’,
 ],
 volition: ‘eating’,
 beliefs: [
‘The mind is a computer’,
‘God exists’
 ]
}

This “JSON object” represents the contents of consciousness, which is the data memory of the mind.  Presumably, there is something relevant to the CPU and the instruction memory, which controls or influences the transitions between conscious states, but those mechanisms are not contents of consciousness.

Many have emphasized the “higher-order” nature of consciouness, which means that the mind can think about itself.  Some, like Hofstaedter (and my father), seem to suggest that it is this “higher-order” nature that makes consciousness what it is.  Dennet is a bit more cautious about this point, but he too finds great importance in this higher-order-ness.  Higher-order-ness can also be modeled in JSON, and I think modeling it in this way can help clarify what higher-order-ness means:

{
 visualField: ‘Bitmap with a computer screen’,
 thoughts: [
‘I see a computer in front of me’,
‘There is a computer in front of me’,
‘I think therefore I am’
 ]
}

When the mind thinks about itself, it has a very high degree of accuracy.  There is nothing logically necessary about this.  It’s just how the mind works.

I Think: A Platonic Dialogue by MC Complete

Daniel: Why do you think we think?

Clement: What do you mean by think?

Daniel: I mean, talk to ourselves in natural language.

Clement: Talk to ourselves internally?

Daniel: Right, not out loud.

Clement: What do you mean by why?

Daniel: Well, in a few places, you seem to imply that the Joyce Machine is a search engine.  Bird calls and Plato's Aviary and all that.

Clement: Surely, thinking accomplishes many different things and works in different ways.  But I am suggesting that one of the main functions of thought (in this sense), perhaps the original function of thought, is the search function.  Soul-searching, you could say.

Daniel: I've been thinking that the Joyce Machine (in this sense) is more of a YouTube than a search engine.

Clement: What do you mean?

Daniel: It's about content creation, not search.  There is no Central Birdkeeper who has to call the birds; the birds ultimately express themselves in our behavior one way or another.  They don't need an intermediary.  They're kind of like demons.  Thinking isn't a method of calling birds; it's a method of creating new birds.

Heterophenomenologists Have Feelings Too

Tribesman: You ask many questions about Feenoman.

Anthropologist: Yes, I want to learn as much as I can about him.

Tribesman: So why should I answer your questions? Why don’t I just take you to meet him?

Anthropologist: You can take me to meet Feenoman?

Tribesman: Follow me.

Feenoman: Hello. You look like an anthropologist.

Anthropologist: And you’re Feenoman?

Feenoman: That’s me.

Anthropologist: Well, if you’ll excuse my impertinence, your tribesman here told me that Feenoman can split the sea. Can you split the sea?

Feenoman: Of course. Want to see?

Anthropologist: Actually, I do.

Feenoman: There. Split. How do you like them apples?

Anthropologist:

Emotional Energy: A Platonic Dialogue by MC Complete

Daniel: You know what I think, Clement?  I think interaction dualism is a scientific hypothesis.

Clement: A scientific hypothesis? You mean, like Intelligent Design?

Daniel: No, I mean like general relativity. When Einstein first dreamed up the theory of relativity, it was not very testable. In the past century, we’ve developed better and better tools to allow us to test the theory. Some aspects, like gravitational waves, are still untested.

Clement: What are you saying? What “tools” do we need to “test” the Theory of Dualism, tools that we don’t currently have?

Daniel: There’s a huge neuroscientific gap. If and when we know more about how the brain really works, we will have a much better idea of whether dualism or materialism is correct.

Clement: I see. Your dualistic mind is a Mind Of The Gaps. That’s exactly what I hate about dualism. The gap in scientific knowledge gives your dualistic mind a place to hide. The smaller the gap gets, the less room it will have. Your dualistic attitude helps to stifle scientific inquiry.

Daniel: Stifle scientific inquiry? I embrace scientific inquiry! I have nothing to be afraid of. I’m not committed to either dualism or materialism. I just want to know what scientific inquiry will reveal, if successful. It’s those who are committed to one side of the debate, like you, who should be afraid.

Clement: Um, sorry if I’m not quaking in my boots, but I’m not really expecting further inquiries into neuroscience to reveal the intervention of an immaterial soul.

Daniel: What makes you so sure?

Clement: Well, the conservation of energy, for one thing.

Daniel: I don’t understand why you seem to think that the Argument from Energy is so watertight. Haven’t you ever heard of emotional energy?

Clement: Emotional energy?

Daniel: Maybe the mind itself is a repository of energy -- maybe some mind/brain interactions transfer energy to the mind from the brain, and some interactions transfer energy from the brain to the mind.

Clement: If the mind can have energy, can it also have mass? Can it have a physical position? If so, in what sense is it not physical?

Daniel: It could have some of those things, or none of those things. It is not physical in the sense that experience is essentially not physical, in other words, experience is an extra property not accounted for yet by physics. Or maybe it’s dark energy.

Clement: Dark energy? Are you serious?

Daniel: No. I mean, no and yes. Dark energy shows that there are some gaps in our understanding of energy as well. Sean Carrol (a strong materialist, by the way) has recently suggested that energy is not always conserved. Or maybe it *is* dark energy. That’s my point, we just don’t know. The conservation of energy is not, in and of itself, a reason to stifle scientific inquiry into the nature of the spirit.

Clement: OK, let’s leave energy aside for a moment. If immaterial souls can causally influence the internals of brain, why can’t my soul control your brain (and thus, your body)?

Daniel: There could be many reasons why. At this point, we don’t have enough empirical data to suggest an answer to such specific questions.

Clement: Can you think of a reason why? Even without evidence, can you imagine a dualist physics that might count as a coherent answer to that question?

Daniel: Good question.  Give me a minute to come up with something, willya?

Clement: No problem. I have all the time in the world.  I'm a fictional character, and the reader won't notice the time passing anyway.

Daniel: Hey Clement, you know what?

Clement: No, what?

Daniel: Nothing's coming to mind.  I think I'll have to get back to you on this one.

Clement: Good luck, Daniel.  Note that I'm not holding my breath.

Materialist Heaven

Some people (Sean Carrol, for example) assume that materialism implies that we’re not going to heaven. Fortunately, Dennet does not make this mistake. However, I found his treatment of materialist heaven a little bit disappointing. In a book of what, 400 pages? he devotes about a half a page to it, and I found his treatment very vague. Maybe he actually wanted certain people not to notice what he was up to.

To me it’s very simple: if materialism is true, then when we die, our minds get uploaded to heaven.

Now I suppose that’s not materialism in the strictest sense. It posits a heaven that is explicitly not made of matter, or at least the kind of matter we know and love. What I mean by materialism is mind-materialism. Not that *everything* is matter, but that the mind is matter. To posit mind-dualism, we need to actually update physics to include a new category of consciousness, which actually has causal interactions with good old matter. But positing a spiritual heaven does not have this problem, since there’s no reason for heaven to interact with the material world. The heaven arrow goes one way.

Now, the secularists of course would say that we have no evidence for the existence of heaven. I think that is not really an objection to what I’m saying here. We have a tradition that heaven is real, and that’s good enough for the purposes of this discussion.

How to Have Your Idealist Cake, and Eat Materialism To!

I think one of the reasons that it was so hard for me to swallow materialism for such a long time is that I couldn’t figure out how to buy materialism without selling my idealism. Subjective, internal space is what I know; objective, external space is theorized and imagined, almost like a fantasy. So I was afraid that buying materialism would be tantamount to trading in reality for a fantasy. If the objective, external, realistic world that I theorize is to be a materialist world, that means that this imagined material world must include, as part of it, appearances and imagination. It must be possible to account for appearances and imagination, Berkeley’s “ideas”, in physical terms. Otherwise, I refused to buy materialism. I would stick with dualism, and if that as well proved incoherent, I could retreat into my idealism and abandon realism altogether.

I believe in Berkeley’s ideas. Could Berkeley’s ideas be matter?

Well, all of the information about the “ideas” can be encoded in matter. Matter is very good at encoding information. It can encode whatever information you want.

So all the information about how the world appears to me can be encoded in matter. “I see a computer screen” could be equivalent to there being a data structure in my brain with an instance variable, {‘visualField’: ‘bitmap with computer screen’}.  All you have to do is give up on the meaning of the term “to see”. The relationship of me to my visual field is just a quale: it has no informational content.  To make materialism work, you simply have to assume that it has no essence either.  This is an easier job than trying to insist that it *has* an essence!  Assume that imagination is just an instance variable, and suddenly it’s very easy to understand how all mental theorizing can be interpreted as information, digitally encoded in the brain of the theorist.