“David,” said Batsheva, “did you see Avshalom take the cookie from the cookie jar?”
“No,” said David.
The funny thing is, David did see Avshalom take the cookie. And he remembers seeing it. But when he told Batsheva that he didn’t see it, he wasn’t lying. You see, David saw Avshalom take the cookie, but he believes that Avshalom can do no wrong, so he believes that he did not see Avshalom take the cookie. Even though he did see it.
My Dear Readers will be quick to point out that, in this scenario, David is probably just doubting his memory. That is, he remembers seeing Avshalom take the cookie, but he believes this memory to be false. So, let’s modify the story. It’ll be a bit less realistic, but not much.
“David,” said Batsheva, “do you remember seeing Avshalom take the cookie from the cookie jar?”
“No,” said David.
A bit trickier here, if you think about it. False memories won’t save us. David believes that he has no memory of Avshalom taking the cookie. We know (we assume for the purposes of the story) that he does indeed remember it. David is not lying, he is mistaken.
Is there something fishy about this story? It sounds plausible, but is it really possible to be mistaken about a question of what you yourself remember? Is it possible that we are consistently mistaken when we reflect on our own memories? If a skeptic challenges our belief in the content of our own memory, can we answer him, or does the skeptic win here too? Can we doubt anything, even the present contents of our own minds? Or is there something different about the present content of my mind? Something special?
How do we know what we are thinking?
David Lewis once made fun of “internalist” philosophers, who claim that we have a special relationship with our own present state of mind. He said that they always end up telling “some fishy story” about how we can have direct knowledge of our own conscious states. Is Lewis right? Or is there One True Story of the World, in which our memories are truly self-evident? Is the fishyness in Lewis’ mind, or in everyone’s mind?
I have some thoughts on this matter, but they’re not fully baked. Meanwhile, Dear Readers, please let me know what you think.
Or what you think you think.
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
The Flotilla of the Haredim
I’m mad at Haaretz.
I mean, I’m mad at Yediot and Maariv too, but I thought Haaretz had a conscience, professionalism.
Every Haaretz article I read on Emanuel said that the parents who pulled their daughters out of the Bais Yaakov were fighting for their right to keep Sephardim out of their schools.
This is so misleading that it’s almost a lie.
The truth is that the litigants, or the prosecution, or whatever you call the lawyers who were trying to force the Emanuel parents to send their daughters back to the Bais Yaakov, claimed that the Emanuel parents intentions’ were to keep Sephardim out of their school (or, at an arm’s length in the same building). However, the Emanuel parents disputed this, and claimed that they were trying to institute a separate Bais Yaakov with higher religious standards than the original Bais Yaakov.
Who was telling the truth? I don’t know. I admit I’m a bit curious, but it’s irrelevant to my point in this blog post. My point is, that in reporting on Emanuel, Haaretz and the rest of the secular media grossly misrepresented the position of the Emanuel parents.
That was lie #1. Lie #1 was just to set the stage for Lie #2, which was much more appalling.
Having established that the Emanuel parents were fighting for their right to discriminate against Sephardim, the secular media “reported” that the huge Haredi demonstrations, staged with the support of the leaders of Ashkenazi Haredim, were in support of the right to discriminate against Sephardim.
Now, who was telling the truth, the Emanuel parents or the litigants? I don’t know. I do know one thing, though: the Haredi leaders and the Haredi demonstrators believed the parents. They were not demonstrating in support of ethnic/racial segregation -- they were demonstrating in support of the claim that the Emanuel parents were not practicing segregation. More specifically, they were demonstrating in support of the right to set religious standards for their schools.
(The policy of admitting students based on the religious standards of the parents is theoretically controversial, but it’s understandable IMAO.)
Emanuel was a trap set by the secular media, and the Haredim fell for it in the worst possible way. It was like the Tar Baby. The more the Haredim kicked and screamed and protested, the more the secular media could say, “Look how much they cherish their racism. All of them. From the leaders to the foot soldiers.” In my arrogant opinion, Emanuel did real, serious damage to the public image of the Haredim.
Why was Emanuel handled this way by the Haredim? Was it simple incompetence? I don’t think so. I think the Haredim have a PR problem. I know that the cry “Bad PR” is often an excuse, but I think in this case it’s true. The Haredim are so insular, so countercultural, so inwardly directed, that they can’t be bothered with PR. The basic attitude is, “Everyone hates us anyway.”
I mean, I’m mad at Yediot and Maariv too, but I thought Haaretz had a conscience, professionalism.
Every Haaretz article I read on Emanuel said that the parents who pulled their daughters out of the Bais Yaakov were fighting for their right to keep Sephardim out of their schools.
This is so misleading that it’s almost a lie.
The truth is that the litigants, or the prosecution, or whatever you call the lawyers who were trying to force the Emanuel parents to send their daughters back to the Bais Yaakov, claimed that the Emanuel parents intentions’ were to keep Sephardim out of their school (or, at an arm’s length in the same building). However, the Emanuel parents disputed this, and claimed that they were trying to institute a separate Bais Yaakov with higher religious standards than the original Bais Yaakov.
Who was telling the truth? I don’t know. I admit I’m a bit curious, but it’s irrelevant to my point in this blog post. My point is, that in reporting on Emanuel, Haaretz and the rest of the secular media grossly misrepresented the position of the Emanuel parents.
That was lie #1. Lie #1 was just to set the stage for Lie #2, which was much more appalling.
Having established that the Emanuel parents were fighting for their right to discriminate against Sephardim, the secular media “reported” that the huge Haredi demonstrations, staged with the support of the leaders of Ashkenazi Haredim, were in support of the right to discriminate against Sephardim.
Now, who was telling the truth, the Emanuel parents or the litigants? I don’t know. I do know one thing, though: the Haredi leaders and the Haredi demonstrators believed the parents. They were not demonstrating in support of ethnic/racial segregation -- they were demonstrating in support of the claim that the Emanuel parents were not practicing segregation. More specifically, they were demonstrating in support of the right to set religious standards for their schools.
(The policy of admitting students based on the religious standards of the parents is theoretically controversial, but it’s understandable IMAO.)
Emanuel was a trap set by the secular media, and the Haredim fell for it in the worst possible way. It was like the Tar Baby. The more the Haredim kicked and screamed and protested, the more the secular media could say, “Look how much they cherish their racism. All of them. From the leaders to the foot soldiers.” In my arrogant opinion, Emanuel did real, serious damage to the public image of the Haredim.
Why was Emanuel handled this way by the Haredim? Was it simple incompetence? I don’t think so. I think the Haredim have a PR problem. I know that the cry “Bad PR” is often an excuse, but I think in this case it’s true. The Haredim are so insular, so countercultural, so inwardly directed, that they can’t be bothered with PR. The basic attitude is, “Everyone hates us anyway.”
Monday, June 14, 2010
The Black Hole War: A Platonic Dialogue by MC Complete
Leonard: That last post of yours was pretty wild.
Daniel: Yeah, I thought you'd appreciate it.
Leonard: Actually, I thought it was kind of misleading how you said that time goes slower near a gravitational collapse. You know that time differences are relative. If you were on the surface of a collapsing object, the collapse would not be slowing down at all. The collapse is only slowing down relative to those far away from it.
Daniel: Those far away from it, like you and me. And everyone else. I doubt there are any experimental physicists who are on location at a gravitational collapse. And if there ever will be, they probably won't come back to tell the tale. And if they do come back to tell the tale, then they definitely left before the collapse completed. I could claim that just before a collapsing object reaches its own Schwarzschild event horizon, an angel appears out of nowhere, stops the collapse, and hands out Krembos. Such a claim could never be disproven by any evidence. Therefore, talk about what happens from the perspective of an observer near a collapsing object is totally unscientific.
Leonard: Oh come on. You know there's no angel handing out Krembos.
Daniel: So maybe it's handing out Bambas. Look, even if you claim, based on the theory alone, that gravitational collapse does complete from the perspective of an observer close to the collapse, any such observer would be living in a very different time frame than us. We would have to put this time frame in our future, if not after the end of time. When I say that black holes do not exist, I'm using the present tense. In my present, and in the present of my audience, black holes do not exist.
Leonard: You have a very interesting argument, but it doesn't square with the facts. Black holes are not some speculative conjecture. They're there. We can see them.
Daniel: By definition, we can't see them. I mean, if they existed, which they don't.
Leonard: Well, we can't see them with the naked eye, just like we can't see atoms with the naked eye. But we have plenty of evidence that they're there.
Daniel: Even wikipedia is careful enough to talk in terms of "black hole candidates", rather then "black holes", to discuss astronomical objects in the actual cosmic landscape. Consider the following statement from wikipedia: "The evidence for stellar black holes strongly relies on the existence of an upper limit for the mass of a neutron star." In other words, theoreticians have proven mathematically that, beyond a certain mass, an object must gravitationally collapse. However, I am arguing that there are objects which are collapsing, that would become black holes if they had enough time to finish collapsing. But there isn't enough time in the world. So perhaps astronomy has evidence that there are objects that have exceeded this limit. I argue that they have not shown that these objects are currently black holes, rather that these objects are in the process of collapsing.
Leonard: Very clever Daniel. Well, any day now we'll pick up some Hawking radiation, which will blow your argument clear out of the water.
Daniel: Maybe, maybe not. But I'm not holding my breath.
Daniel: Yeah, I thought you'd appreciate it.
Leonard: Actually, I thought it was kind of misleading how you said that time goes slower near a gravitational collapse. You know that time differences are relative. If you were on the surface of a collapsing object, the collapse would not be slowing down at all. The collapse is only slowing down relative to those far away from it.
Daniel: Those far away from it, like you and me. And everyone else. I doubt there are any experimental physicists who are on location at a gravitational collapse. And if there ever will be, they probably won't come back to tell the tale. And if they do come back to tell the tale, then they definitely left before the collapse completed. I could claim that just before a collapsing object reaches its own Schwarzschild event horizon, an angel appears out of nowhere, stops the collapse, and hands out Krembos. Such a claim could never be disproven by any evidence. Therefore, talk about what happens from the perspective of an observer near a collapsing object is totally unscientific.
Leonard: Oh come on. You know there's no angel handing out Krembos.
Daniel: So maybe it's handing out Bambas. Look, even if you claim, based on the theory alone, that gravitational collapse does complete from the perspective of an observer close to the collapse, any such observer would be living in a very different time frame than us. We would have to put this time frame in our future, if not after the end of time. When I say that black holes do not exist, I'm using the present tense. In my present, and in the present of my audience, black holes do not exist.
Leonard: You have a very interesting argument, but it doesn't square with the facts. Black holes are not some speculative conjecture. They're there. We can see them.
Daniel: By definition, we can't see them. I mean, if they existed, which they don't.
Leonard: Well, we can't see them with the naked eye, just like we can't see atoms with the naked eye. But we have plenty of evidence that they're there.
Daniel: Even wikipedia is careful enough to talk in terms of "black hole candidates", rather then "black holes", to discuss astronomical objects in the actual cosmic landscape. Consider the following statement from wikipedia: "The evidence for stellar black holes strongly relies on the existence of an upper limit for the mass of a neutron star." In other words, theoreticians have proven mathematically that, beyond a certain mass, an object must gravitationally collapse. However, I am arguing that there are objects which are collapsing, that would become black holes if they had enough time to finish collapsing. But there isn't enough time in the world. So perhaps astronomy has evidence that there are objects that have exceeded this limit. I argue that they have not shown that these objects are currently black holes, rather that these objects are in the process of collapsing.
Leonard: Very clever Daniel. Well, any day now we'll pick up some Hawking radiation, which will blow your argument clear out of the water.
Daniel: Maybe, maybe not. But I'm not holding my breath.
Sunday, June 6, 2010
Some Things Really do Take Forever
The wikipedia article on black holes says, "It is now widely accepted that the center of every or at least nearly every galaxy contains a supermassive black hole."
Well, it's not accepted by me.
In fact, I don't think that any galaxy has any black holes of any mass. I don't believe in black holes. Here's why: black holes are created by gravitational collapse. I think gravitational collapse takes forever.
Einstein taught us that gravity pulls time. The stronger a gravitational field, the slower time moves. And as an object gravitationally collapses toward being a black hole, its gravitational field is extremely strong. Its strength approaches infinity. Thus, the "speed" of time near the object approaches zero. Which means that the collapse itself goes slower and slower. And, I would argue, never actually "finishes" (finishes in the sense of creating a real black hole).
I've talked to some physicists about this. There was a guy in the office who had a PhD in black hole studies. So I asked him my question. He couldn't really answer it, and eventually he got very annoyed with me. (Then he transferred to the US. I assume this had nothing to do with our conversation about black holes.)
I emailed Brian Greene about this, and he said, "Talk to me after you read Susskind's Intro to Black Holes." So I put it on my reading list, but I haven't gotten around to it. I guess I could have written back and told Greene that I'd already read Susskind's Black Hole War, but I didn't.
Well, it's not accepted by me.
In fact, I don't think that any galaxy has any black holes of any mass. I don't believe in black holes. Here's why: black holes are created by gravitational collapse. I think gravitational collapse takes forever.
Einstein taught us that gravity pulls time. The stronger a gravitational field, the slower time moves. And as an object gravitationally collapses toward being a black hole, its gravitational field is extremely strong. Its strength approaches infinity. Thus, the "speed" of time near the object approaches zero. Which means that the collapse itself goes slower and slower. And, I would argue, never actually "finishes" (finishes in the sense of creating a real black hole).
I've talked to some physicists about this. There was a guy in the office who had a PhD in black hole studies. So I asked him my question. He couldn't really answer it, and eventually he got very annoyed with me. (Then he transferred to the US. I assume this had nothing to do with our conversation about black holes.)
I emailed Brian Greene about this, and he said, "Talk to me after you read Susskind's Intro to Black Holes." So I put it on my reading list, but I haven't gotten around to it. I guess I could have written back and told Greene that I'd already read Susskind's Black Hole War, but I didn't.
Sunday, May 30, 2010
Ideas Matter: A Platonic Dialogue by MC Complete
David: You know, you're beginning to sound a lot like George. Are you becoming an idealist in your old age?
Daniel: Yes and no. Have you read Stewart Shapiro's book, "Thinking About Mathematics"?
David: Of course I have. That's an excellent book. The only thing that I don't like about it is that there's no section about me.
Daniel: Remember how Shapiro distinguishes between two kinds of mathematical realism?
David: Yes, "ontological realism" and "truth-value realism". An "ontological realist" believes that numbers exist as objects, whereas a "truth-value realist" believes that mathematical statements are true, but that the numbers and other mathematical things do not really exist as objects.
Daniel: I'm a truth-value realist.
David: About what? About math?
Daniel: About life, the universe, and everything. About matter, you could say. That's why I wouldn't call myself an idealist, even though I strongly sympathize with the subjective idealist position.
David: You're suggesting that matter is not ontologically real, but it's real in truth-value? How could that be? If matter is not ontologically real, how can it be anything?
Daniel: I mean that atoms, molecules, stars, plants, animals, building blocks, tennis balls etc. may not be ontologically real, but statements made about them are true (or, sometimes false, according to the common-sense criteria for these things). You just need to do a little bit of reinterpretation.
David: Sure, that's what you were saying in your last blog post, that science can be philosophically justified if you reinterpret it. But why is that not subjective idealism?
Daniel: Can you stand on the pavement for a minute?
David: Another experiment?
Daniel: Now take this wooden block.
David: Wow! That's beautiful! Where did you get that?
Daniel: At the toy store on Rothschild, if you can believe that. Now put it down on the pavement and roll it.
Daniel: How does it roll?
David: Not very well. It doesn't really roll at all.
Daniel: Why not?
David: I don't know. Because it's a block, I guess.
Daniel: Right, it's shaped like a cube. Here's another one from the same set. Stack it on top of the first one.
David: These things are really spectacular. How many of them do you have?
Daniel: There were eleven in the set, but I only brought two of them. Now give me back the blocks and come back to the sidewalk.
David: Are we done with the experiment?
Daniel: Here's the tennis ball from my last post. Roll this. And here's another tennis ball. Can you stack it on top of the first one?
Daniel: Yes and no. Have you read Stewart Shapiro's book, "Thinking About Mathematics"?
David: Of course I have. That's an excellent book. The only thing that I don't like about it is that there's no section about me.
Daniel: Remember how Shapiro distinguishes between two kinds of mathematical realism?
David: Yes, "ontological realism" and "truth-value realism". An "ontological realist" believes that numbers exist as objects, whereas a "truth-value realist" believes that mathematical statements are true, but that the numbers and other mathematical things do not really exist as objects.
Daniel: I'm a truth-value realist.
David: About what? About math?
Daniel: About life, the universe, and everything. About matter, you could say. That's why I wouldn't call myself an idealist, even though I strongly sympathize with the subjective idealist position.
David: You're suggesting that matter is not ontologically real, but it's real in truth-value? How could that be? If matter is not ontologically real, how can it be anything?
Daniel: I mean that atoms, molecules, stars, plants, animals, building blocks, tennis balls etc. may not be ontologically real, but statements made about them are true (or, sometimes false, according to the common-sense criteria for these things). You just need to do a little bit of reinterpretation.
David: Sure, that's what you were saying in your last blog post, that science can be philosophically justified if you reinterpret it. But why is that not subjective idealism?
Daniel: Can you stand on the pavement for a minute?
David: Another experiment?
Daniel: Now take this wooden block.
David: Wow! That's beautiful! Where did you get that?
Daniel: At the toy store on Rothschild, if you can believe that. Now put it down on the pavement and roll it.
David tries to roll the block.
Daniel: How does it roll?
David: Not very well. It doesn't really roll at all.
Daniel: Why not?
David: I don't know. Because it's a block, I guess.
Daniel: Right, it's shaped like a cube. Here's another one from the same set. Stack it on top of the first one.
David: These things are really spectacular. How many of them do you have?
Daniel: There were eleven in the set, but I only brought two of them. Now give me back the blocks and come back to the sidewalk.
David: Are we done with the experiment?
Daniel: Here's the tennis ball from my last post. Roll this. And here's another tennis ball. Can you stack it on top of the first one?
David: No, these tennis balls don't stack...
Daniel: Very good, I'll take back the balls.
David: Anything else? Pyramids?
Daniel: No, that's it. Now, let's talk about what just happened. You were on the pavement for a few minutes, then you were on the sidewalk.
David: I don't know, maybe I wasn't.
Daniel: But you remember being on the pavement then on the sidewalk, and playing with blocks and tennis balls.
David: Yes, I remember it well.
Daniel: We could talk about two memory streams, one composed of ordered, contiguous remembered moments on the pavement, and one composed of moments on the sidewalk.
David: That sounds like a good way of thinking about it.
Daniel: What is the difference between those two memory streams?
David: I don't know. There are a lot of differences. What are you getting at?
Daniel: In each stream, you were playing with two objects, but on the pavement you couldn't roll the objects, they stacked well, and they had straight edges. All of those properties are properties of the memory stream, not a quality of any single moment of memory.
David: I don't know, maybe I wasn't.
Daniel: But you remember being on the pavement then on the sidewalk, and playing with blocks and tennis balls.
David: Yes, I remember it well.
Daniel: We could talk about two memory streams, one composed of ordered, contiguous remembered moments on the pavement, and one composed of moments on the sidewalk.
David: That sounds like a good way of thinking about it.
Daniel: What is the difference between those two memory streams?
David: I don't know. There are a lot of differences. What are you getting at?
Daniel: In each stream, you were playing with two objects, but on the pavement you couldn't roll the objects, they stacked well, and they had straight edges. All of those properties are properties of the memory stream, not a quality of any single moment of memory.
David: Properties of the memory stream. OK, that makes sense.
Daniel: So you generalize over these disparate properties of the memory stream with a single property, and say that on the pavement you were playing with balls.
David: But the balls would only be a property of the memory stream, not objects with a distinct ontological existence.
Daniel: That's exactly what I'm saying. Matter is a property of memory streams. Or, any material object is a property of a memory stream.
David: That kind of makes sense, but weren't you going to distance yourself from subjective idealism? It still sounds like idealism to me.
Daniel: I think that our common sense notions of matter are correct, they just need a little bit of reinterpretation.
David: So you're saying that our common sense notions of matter are correct in the sense that they're incorrect.
Daniel: No. Our common sense notions of matter are correct in the particulars. The necessary reinterpretation is in the realm of the extremely general.
David: But you're not saying something that a subjective idealist would disagree with. At best, you're providing better tools of analysis.
Daniel: So call it analytical philosophy. The bottom line is this: George always says that matter is a delusion. I say that, when correctly viewed, matter is a property of a memory stream. Matter isn't a delusion, it's an illusion. It's the perfect illusion. And the perfect illusion is equivalent to reality.
Ideas Matter: A Platonic Dialogue by MC Complete
David: You know, you're beginning to sound a lot like George. Are you becoming an idealist in your old age?
Daniel: Yes and no. Have you read Stewart Shapiro's book, "Thinking About Mathematics"?
David: Of course I have. That's an excellent book. The only thing that I don't like about it is that there's no section about me.
Daniel: Remember how Shapiro distinguishes between two kinds of mathematical realism?
David: Yes, "ontological realism" and "truth-value realism". An "ontological realist" believes that numbers exist as objects, whereas a "truth-value realist" believes that mathematical statements are true, but that the numbers and other mathematical things do not really exist as objects.
Daniel: I'm a truth-value realist.
David: About what? About math?
Daniel: About life, the universe, and everything. About matter, you could say. That's why I wouldn't call myself an idealist, even though I strongly sympathize with the subjective idealist position.
David: You're suggesting that matter is not ontologically real, but it's real in truth-value? How could that be? If matter is not ontologically real, how can it be anything?
Daniel: I mean that atoms, molecules, stars, plants, animals, building blocks, tennis balls etc. may not be ontologically real, but statements made about them are true (or, sometimes false, according to the common-sense criteria for these things). You just need to do a little bit of reinterpretation.
David: Sure, that's what you were saying in your last blog post, that science can be philosophically justified if you reinterpret it. But why is that not subjective idealism?
Daniel: Can you stand on the pavement for a minute?
David: Another experiment?
Daniel: Now take this wooden block.
David: Wow! That's beautiful! Where did you get that?
Daniel: At the toy store on Rothschild, if you can believe that. Now put it down on the pavement and roll it.
Daniel: How does it roll?
David: Not very well. It doesn't really roll at all.
Daniel: Why not?
David: I don't know. Because it's a block, I guess.
Daniel: Right, it's shaped like a cube. Here's another one from the same set. Stack it on top of the first one.
David: These things are really spectacular. How many of them do you have?
Daniel: There were eleven in the set, but I only brought two of them. Now give me back the blocks and come back to the sidewalk.
David: Are we done with the experiment?
Daniel: Here's the tennis ball from my last post. Roll this. And here's another tennis ball. Can you stack it on top of the first one?
Daniel: Yes and no. Have you read Stewart Shapiro's book, "Thinking About Mathematics"?
David: Of course I have. That's an excellent book. The only thing that I don't like about it is that there's no section about me.
Daniel: Remember how Shapiro distinguishes between two kinds of mathematical realism?
David: Yes, "ontological realism" and "truth-value realism". An "ontological realist" believes that numbers exist as objects, whereas a "truth-value realist" believes that mathematical statements are true, but that the numbers and other mathematical things do not really exist as objects.
Daniel: I'm a truth-value realist.
David: About what? About math?
Daniel: About life, the universe, and everything. About matter, you could say. That's why I wouldn't call myself an idealist, even though I strongly sympathize with the subjective idealist position.
David: You're suggesting that matter is not ontologically real, but it's real in truth-value? How could that be? If matter is not ontologically real, how can it be anything?
Daniel: I mean that atoms, molecules, stars, plants, animals, building blocks, tennis balls etc. may not be ontologically real, but statements made about them are true (or, sometimes false, according to the common-sense criteria for these things). You just need to do a little bit of reinterpretation.
David: Sure, that's what you were saying in your last blog post, that science can be philosophically justified if you reinterpret it. But why is that not subjective idealism?
Daniel: Can you stand on the pavement for a minute?
David: Another experiment?
Daniel: Now take this wooden block.
David: Wow! That's beautiful! Where did you get that?
Daniel: At the toy store on Rothschild, if you can believe that. Now put it down on the pavement and roll it.
David tries to roll the block.
Daniel: How does it roll?
David: Not very well. It doesn't really roll at all.
Daniel: Why not?
David: I don't know. Because it's a block, I guess.
Daniel: Right, it's shaped like a cube. Here's another one from the same set. Stack it on top of the first one.
David: These things are really spectacular. How many of them do you have?
Daniel: There were eleven in the set, but I only brought two of them. Now give me back the blocks and come back to the sidewalk.
David: Are we done with the experiment?
Daniel: Here's the tennis ball from my last post. Roll this. And here's another tennis ball. Can you stack it on top of the first one?
David: No, these tennis balls don't stack...
Daniel: Very good, I'll take back the balls.
David: Anything else? Pyramids?
Daniel: No, that's it. Now, let's talk about what just happened. You were on the pavement for a few minutes, then you were on the sidewalk.
David: I don't know, maybe I wasn't.
Daniel: But you remember being on the pavement then on the sidewalk, and playing with blocks and tennis balls.
David: Yes, I remember it well.
Daniel: We could talk about two memory streams, one composed of ordered, contiguous remembered moments on the pavement, and one composed of moments on the sidewalk.
David: That sounds like a good way of thinking about it.
Daniel: What is the difference between those two memory streams?
David: I don't know. There are a lot of differences. What are you getting at?
Daniel: In each stream, you were playing with two objects, but on the pavement you couldn't roll the objects, they stacked well, and they had straight edges. All of those properties are properties of the memory stream, not a quality of any single moment of memory.
David: I don't know, maybe I wasn't.
Daniel: But you remember being on the pavement then on the sidewalk, and playing with blocks and tennis balls.
David: Yes, I remember it well.
Daniel: We could talk about two memory streams, one composed of ordered, contiguous remembered moments on the pavement, and one composed of moments on the sidewalk.
David: That sounds like a good way of thinking about it.
Daniel: What is the difference between those two memory streams?
David: I don't know. There are a lot of differences. What are you getting at?
Daniel: In each stream, you were playing with two objects, but on the pavement you couldn't roll the objects, they stacked well, and they had straight edges. All of those properties are properties of the memory stream, not a quality of any single moment of memory.
David: Properties of the memory stream. OK, that makes sense.
Daniel: So you generalize over these disparate properties of the memory stream with a single property, and say that on the pavement you were playing with balls.
David: But the balls would only be a property of the memory stream, not objects with a distinct ontological existence.
Daniel: That's exactly what I'm saying. Matter is a property of memory streams. Or, any material object is a property of a memory stream.
David: That kind of makes sense, but weren't you going to distance yourself from subjective idealism? It still sounds like idealism to me.
Daniel: I think that our common sense notions of matter are correct, they just need a little bit of reinterpretation.
David: So you're saying that our common sense notions of matter are correct in the sense that they're incorrect.
Daniel: No. Our common sense notions of matter are correct in the particulars. The necessary reinterpretation is in the realm of the extremely general.
David: But you're not saying something that a subjective idealist would disagree with. At best, you're providing better tools of analysis.
Daniel: So call it analytical philosophy. The bottom line is this: George always says that matter is a delusion. I say that, when correctly viewed, matter is a property of a memory stream. Matter isn't a delusion, it's an illusion. It's the perfect illusion. And the perfect illusion is equivalent to reality.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
Thoughts on Avot 1:4
"Antigonus, leader of Socho, received the tradition from Shimon the Righteous. He used to say: be not like servants who serve the master for the sake of receiving a reward; instead be like servants who serve their master not for the sake of receiving a reward. And may the awe of Heaven be upon you." (Artscroll translation of Chapters of the Fathers 1:4)
Antigonus is telling us that, in our relationship with God, we should be like forced laborers, not like paid laborers. We should not see ourselves as God's employees but rather as God's slaves. What the Artscroll translates as "the awe of Heaven" might be better translated as "the fear of Heaven." Just as the slave's ultimate motivation for serving his master is fear, so too our ultimate motivation for serving our Master must be fear. As the Artscroll comments on the phrase "awe of Heaven", "This reverence must be maintained even though one has great love for God, for awe will inhibit one from transgressing His laws, while love not complemented by fear may lead one to take excessive liberties."
If God can be compared to a slave master, He must be compared to a very benevolent slave master, though I would guess that most earthly masters have not been benevolent at all. A benevolent slave master "gives" many things to his slaves: food, a place to live, clothes, etc. However, none of these things are given as payment for the slave's labor. They are given by the master out of his feeling of responsibility for his slaves, out of his personal relationship with his slaves, out of his generosity. With an employee, on the other hand, no matter how good his relationship with his employer, the paycheck is always given in exchange for the labor. It's nothing personal, it's a quid pro quo. For the tzaddik, the blessings that he receives are never received in exchange for the tzaddik's mitzvot; rather, they flow from God's love and generosity.
Antigonus is telling us that, in our relationship with God, we should be like forced laborers, not like paid laborers. We should not see ourselves as God's employees but rather as God's slaves. What the Artscroll translates as "the awe of Heaven" might be better translated as "the fear of Heaven." Just as the slave's ultimate motivation for serving his master is fear, so too our ultimate motivation for serving our Master must be fear. As the Artscroll comments on the phrase "awe of Heaven", "This reverence must be maintained even though one has great love for God, for awe will inhibit one from transgressing His laws, while love not complemented by fear may lead one to take excessive liberties."
If God can be compared to a slave master, He must be compared to a very benevolent slave master, though I would guess that most earthly masters have not been benevolent at all. A benevolent slave master "gives" many things to his slaves: food, a place to live, clothes, etc. However, none of these things are given as payment for the slave's labor. They are given by the master out of his feeling of responsibility for his slaves, out of his personal relationship with his slaves, out of his generosity. With an employee, on the other hand, no matter how good his relationship with his employer, the paycheck is always given in exchange for the labor. It's nothing personal, it's a quid pro quo. For the tzaddik, the blessings that he receives are never received in exchange for the tzaddik's mitzvot; rather, they flow from God's love and generosity.
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